Stochastic Dynamic Games in Belief Space by Schwarting, Wilko et al.
1Stochastic Dynamic Games in Belief Space
Wilko Schwarting, Alyssa Pierson, Sertac Karaman, and Daniela Rus
Abstract—Information gathering while interacting with other
agents is critical in many emerging domains, such as self-driving
cars, service robots, drone racing, and active surveillance. In these
interactions, the interests of agents may be at odds with others,
resulting in a non-cooperative dynamic game. Since unveiling
one’s own strategy to adversaries is undesirable, each agent
must independently predict the other agents’ future actions
without communication. In the face of uncertainty from sensor
and actuator noise, agents have to gain information over their
own state, the states of others, and the environment. They
must also consider how their own actions reveal information to
others. We formulate this non-cooperative multi-agent planning
problem as a stochastic dynamic game. Our solution uses local
iterative dynamic programming in the belief space to find a Nash
equilibrium of the game. We present three applications: active
surveillance, guiding eyes for a blind agent, and autonomous
racing. Agents with game-theoretic belief space planning win
44% more races compared to a baseline without game theory
and 34% more than without belief space planning.
Index Terms—Motion and Path Planning, Optimization and
Optimal Control, Multi-Robot Systems, Game-Theoretic Plan-
ning
I. INTRODUCTION
WE aim to develop planners for multi-agent systems thatare robust under uncertainty and combine information-
seeking behavior with game-theoretic reasoning. While game
theory can model the interaction and dependency among
agents, it does not address the quality of information available
to the agent for decision making. Agents must plan and act
within a game, gain information, and leverage the informa-
tion gain to improve their control policies. We propose an
approach that combines game-theoretic planning with belief-
space planning, leveraging the interaction models from game
theory while incorporating uncertainties in the perception.
In multi-agent systems, we find that agents gather in-
formation to reduce uncertainty while maintaining decision-
making strategies that support complex interactions. While
each agent operates independently, they have a model of what
the other agents are or should be doing. This model can be
prescribed, observed, sensed, or communicated. Applications
include assistive robotics, surveillance, pursuer-evader games,
and racing.
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Fig. 1. One application we present is dynamic racing. Here, the blue agent
starts with a disadvantage, but is equipped with better acceleration and capable
of moving faster through corners than the red agent. Our approach allows the
blue agent to overtake and win the race. Planned trajectories and chance
constraints are shown in dashed lines and ellipses. The traces correspond to
the true state (solid) and the noisy EKF-estimate (dashed) available to each
agent during the race. The red areas are zones with low noise observations
and reduce uncertainty.
Within the game-theoretic framework, agents take actions
that increase their information gain, which in turn results in
the ability to improve their control policies with reduced un-
certainty. For example, an assistive robot tasked with guiding
a human may explore the environment to reduce uncertainty
and better navigate. Conversely, a game-theoretic setting can
model adversarial agents. Here, agents may choose to “hide”
to prevent others from gathering information about themselves,
which is relevant to surveillance applications. In the context of
racing, agents may force others to increase their uncertainty,
such as by pressuring them to drive too fast in a corner which
increases uncertainty in their state, or by simply pushing them
into the dark. It is therefore not only important to reason about
a robot’s own uncertainty but also the uncertainty of other
agents in the environment, and even more so how one’s actions
impact the change in uncertainty of others.
Game-theoretic models have not only proven useful to
model interactions between autonomous systems, but also
in integrating interactive human predictions into autonomous
decision-making and planning. We can model the actions
of humans as expected cost-minimizing and estimate human
cost functions from past observed trajectories with Inverse
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2Reinforcement Learning (IRL) [1]. Consequently, computing
expected cost-minimizing actions based on the learned cost
functions generates human predictions. The expected cost-
minimizing behavior can also be interpreted as a best response
to an autonomous agent’s actions. This best response setting
allows us to estimate how the autonomous system’s actions
influence human actions. The autonomous system can there-
fore indirectly control the human’s actions to a certain degree.
This technique has been applied to predict human behavior for
autonomous vehicles [2, 3], and to predict pedestrians [4]. The
combination of game-theoretic modeling of human behavior
and information seeking planning are therefore even more
promising.
Home service robots can provide assistance and support to
humans, particularly the elderly population. These robots need
to work in close proximity of humans, gauge the human’s
intent, and understand the state of mind of others to better
perform tasks. They have to avoid confusion and misun-
derstandings and will need to seek information about both
their environment and surrounding humans. Additionally, these
autonomous systems need to also reason about the amount of
information and understanding the human has about the robot.
The robot can aid the human’s understanding through explicit
communication, as well as implicitly through behavior, such
as moving to visible locations or clearly indicating intent by
unambiguously moving in a desired direction.
We propose a solution that combines multi-agent game-
theoretic decision-making under uncertainty and belief space
planning (BSP). Our approach supports robust solutions to
a wide range of multi-robot applications where dealing with
uncertainty, the need to gather information, and game-theoretic
decision-making are fundamental. We build on important
advancements in two areas: game-theoretic planning and belief
space planning. Game-theoretic planning successfully solves
problems where an agent’s objective is at odds with the
objective of other agents, such as in modeling human behavior
in traffic [5, 6, 7], and leveraging the effects on humans
by autonomous cars [2]. A recent review on game theory
and control can be found in [8]. In game theory, the Nash
equilibrium is a proposed solution of a non-cooperative game
involving two or more players. Each player is assumed to
know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and
no player has anything to gain by changing only their own
strategy. Solving for Nash equilibria has been applied to
competitive racing [9, 10, 11] and guiding vehicles through
intersections [12]. Solution methods in racing include Iterated
Best Response [9, 11], using discrete payoff matrices [10],
or solving the necessary conditions. We will solve for the
necessary condition at each stage in the backward-pass of
iterative dynamic programming to iteratively solve for the
Nash equilibrium of the game.
While game-theoretic planning models the interaction and
dependency among agents, it does not address the quality of
information available to the agent for decision making. Belief-
space planning [13] uses beliefs, which are the distributions of
the robot’s state estimate, to represent the uncertainties in the
perception of the robot. The problem of computing a control
policy over the space of belief states is formally described as a
Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP), and
has been studied extensively. Solutions to POMDPs are known
to be very complex. Solving a POMDP to global optimality is
NP-hard: solutions such as point-based algorithms [14, 15, 16,
17] in discrete space are bound to the curse of history, as well
as sampling based solvers [18, 19, 20]. Optimization-based
approaches have been developed for planning in continuous
belief space [21, 22, 23, 24, 25], by approximating beliefs as
Gaussian distributions and computing a value function valid
in local regions of the belief space. In comparison to point-
based algorithms which scale exponentially in the planning
horizon l, optimization-based methods scale linearly, O(l). We
follow this direction but do not rely on the common maximum-
likelihood observation assumption [23, 22].
The cognitive theory of mind [26] is separated into first-
order belief space (e.g., I think they think that...) and second-
order belief space (e.g., I think they think that I think that...),
essentially a belief space over the deduced belief space of
others. In general one can imagine higher order belief spaces
since one can continue this chain of reasoning infinitely often
(e.g., I think they think that I think they think that I think... and
so on). Formulating beliefs over beliefs becomes intractable
for real-time applications with this infinite recursion. We find
that parametrizing belief spaces efficiently is essential to gen-
erating real-time capable algorithms. To limit computational
complexity, we consider a first-order belief space.
Assumption 1. First-Order Belief Space: We use a first-order
approximation of the belief space.
Under Assumption 1, we limit the recursion in calculating
the belief space, which keeps computation complexity at a
reasonable level and avoids an explosion in parameters in
the recursive beliefs over beliefs. In Section IV, we evaluate
cases, such as competitive racing, where this assumption is
a simplification of the true system dynamics. In the racing
game, all agents reason about themselves and also have a belief
over others, but do not reason about the belief others have
about themselves. The first-order belief assumption states that
agents A’s belief over agent B is the same as agent B’s belief
about themselves, which is not necessarily the case in the real
world. However, while these belief mismatches may occur, we
see performance improvements over a game-theoretic baseline
without belief space planning, see Sec. IV-C, which highlights
the importance of accounting for uncertainty and information
gain in competitive racing and other applications.
The first order belief assumption implies “common knowl-
edge” of costs, dynamics, and measurement functions for all
agents. Assumption 2 defines this shared knowledge among
the agents.
Assumption 2. Cost, dynamics, and observation functions of
each agent are known by every agent, such that each agent
can predict the actions of other agents using these functions.
Similar assumptions have been made by related game-
theoretic works, see [2, 5, 9, 10, 11]. Note that Assumption 2
only states that agents share knowledge of the functions, but
3each agent still performs its individual computation of these
values with its own noise.
We present a computationally-tractable solution to multi-
agent planning that combines game-theoretic planning and
belief space planning to interact within a problem formulated
as a game, gain information, and leverage the information
gain to improve the agents’ control policies. The main limiting
factor in applying either game theory or belief space planning,
and even more so the combination of both to robotic control
problems lies in the associated computational complexity. To
the best of our knowledge this is the first work to combine
general dynamic games and planning in belief space into an
efficient real-time algorithm. The main contributions of this
paper are:
1) A method for computing Nash equilibria for dynamic
games in belief space;
2) A linear feedback law, similar to linear-quadratic Gaus-
sian control (LQG) for the robot resulting from the
solution, and also a predicted linear feedback law for
all other agents;
3) State and control trajectory based regularization to en-
sure convergence;
4) Evaluation of the proposed method in three stochastic
dynamic games: racing with autonomous vehicles, active
surveillance, and guiding eyes for a blind agent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II introduces dynamic games in belief space, including
a general definition of best response POMDPs and a Nash
equilibrium formulation of the non-cooperative dynamic game.
The resulting problem definition is given in Section II-A, and
assuming beliefs can be represented in the form of Gaussian
distributions, approximating the belief dynamics based on an
extended Kalman filter is detailed in Section III-A. Our method
computes a locally-optimal solution to the best response
POMDP problem with continuous state and action spaces and
non-linear dynamics and observation models by iteratively
solving for a local Nash equilibrium, outlined in Section III.
We utilize a belief space variant of iterative linear-quadratic
Gaussian control (iLQG) to compute the Nash equilibrium,
Section III-C, by solving for a local Nash equilibrium at each
stage of the backward pass, see Section III-B. At each iteration,
each agent’s value function is approximated based on a quadra-
tization around a nominal trajectory, and the belief dynamics
are approximated with an extended Kalman filter. We describe
regularization techniques in Section III-D to ensure that the
algorithm converges regardless of initial conditions. Based
on these findings, we introduce Algorithm 1 in Section III-E
describing the full belief space Nash equilibrium computation.
We show the potential of our approach in Section IV
by presenting three multi-agent problems that combine the
information-seeking behavior with our game-theoretic formu-
lation: active surveillance, guiding blind agents, and racing
with autonomous vehicles.
II. DYNAMIC GAMES IN BELIEF SPACE
We first define POMDPs in their most general form (follow-
ing notation of [27, 24]), then formulate the resulting game
TABLE I
MAIN SYMBOLS AND NOTATION
x,u, z,b State, control input, and measurement
b, s = [b>,u>]> Belief, short for belief and controls
Qi, V i Action-value and value function of agent i
pii Optimal control policy of agent i
jk , Kk feedforward and feedback gains at time k
cik(bk,uk), c
i
l(bl) Cost of agent i at time k, and terminal cost
xk+1 = f(xk,uk,mk) State transition with process noise mk
zk = h(xk,nk) Measurement function with meas. noise nk
bk+1 = β(bk,uk, zk+1) Belief transition
b = b¯ + δb Nominal + perturbation, similar for u, s
cis,k , c
i
ss,k Jacobian and Hessian of c
i
k evaluated at s¯k
Similar for other partial derivatives
and derive the Nash Equilibrium to be solved for.
We write the belief space planning problem as a stochastic
optimal control problem. Consider a system of N agents i ∈
{1, ..., N}, with agent i’s state at time k denoted xik ∈ Rnxi ,
measurement as zik ∈ Rnzi , and control input uik ∈ Rnui . For
brevity we refer to xk = [x
1,>
k , . . . ,x
N,>
k ]
> ∈ Rnx as the joint
state, zk = [z
1,>
k , . . . , z
N,>
k ]
> ∈ Rnz as the joint measure-
ment, and uk = [u
1,>
k , . . . ,u
N,>
k ]
> ∈ Rnu as the joint control,
consisting of all agents, and u¬ik indicates controls of all other
agents except i. We will refer to u = [u0,u1, . . . ,ul−1] as the
control trajectory until time l. Let bij be the individual belief
about the i-th agent computed by the j-th agent. By applying
Assumption 1, we have that bij ≈ bii, or in other words agent
j’s belief over agent i is the same as agent i’s belief about
themselves. Thus, we will just use the notation bi to refer
to the individual belief about the i-th agent. The joint belief
b(xk) is defined as the distribution of the state xk given all
past control inputs and sensor measurements, and consists of
individual beliefs bi. For brevity, we define s = [b>,u>]>.
Following [27, 24], we compute the belief by
b(xk) = p(xk|u0, . . . ,uk−1, z1, . . . , zk), (1)
from all past control inputs and sensor measurements. The
stochastic dynamics and observation model, here formulated
in probabilistic notation as
xk+1 ∼ p(xk+1|xk,uk), zk ∼ p(zk|xk), (2)
can be used to propagate the belief given a control input uk
and a measurement zk+1 by Bayesian filtering:
b(xk+1) = ηp(zk+1|xk+1)
∫
p(xk+1|xk,uk)b(xk)dxk.
(3)
In (3), η is a normalizer independent of xk+1 and b(xk+1)
contains the uncertainty originating from the stochastic dy-
namics, the uncertain measurement and the uncertainty in the
belief at the previous time step. We employ the shorthand bk
to refer to b(xk). The stochastic belief dynamics are defined
by (3) and are written as
bk+1 = β(bk,uk, zk+1). (4)
The expected return of each individual agent i under a
control trajectory of all agents u, including its own control
4trajectory ui, subject to uncertainty on the observed measure-
ments z over the horizon l is determined by the action-value
function
Qi(b0,u) = E
z
[
cil(bl) +
l−1∑
k=0
cik(bk,uk)
]
. (5)
Here cik(·) denotes the cost at time k and cil(·) denotes the
terminal cost of agent i. Since there exists an action-value
function for each agent, there are N distinct action-value
functions Qi for i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
We will first formulate the two problems of (1) solving the
general POMDP best response game, and then (2) finding the
Nash equilibrium of this game.
Problem 1. POMDP Best Response Game: Given an initial
belief b0, for agents i ∈ {1, ..., N}, we need to solve the
stochastic optimal control problem
pii(b0) = arg min
ui
Qi(b0,u) ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N} (6)
s.t. bk+1 = β(bk,uk, zk+1), (7)
for each agent by minimizing each agent’s expected cost with
respect to their own controls ui, where Qi(b0,u) is the action-
value function of agent i.
Note that all agents’ optimal policies pii(b0,u¬i) depend on
the actions of all other agents because each agent i minimizes
their own action-value function Qi(b0,u). The result is a non-
cooperative game [28] in which all agents’ policies depend on
the optimal policies of all other agents pii(b0, pi¬i). Since all
policies are optimized jointly and severally, the dependence of
agent i’s policy pii on other agents’ controls u¬i is resolved by
inserting their optimal policy pi¬i. We therefore denote pii(b0)
instead of pii(b0,u¬i).
A general solution to (6) can be defined recursively by the
Bellman equation:
V il (bl) = cl(bl), (8)
Qik(bk,uk) = c
i
k(bk,uk) + E
zk+1
[
V ik+1(β(bk,uk, zk+1))
]
,
V ik (bk) = min
uik
Qik(bk,uk),
piik(bk) = arg min
uik
Qik(bk,uk),
where V ik (bk) is the value function and pi
i
k(bk) the optimal
policy at time k. Note that in (8) the cost cik(bk,uk), the
reached value function V ik+1(β(bk,uk, zk+1)), and therefore
the action-value function Qik(bk,uk) of agent i depends not
only on its own action but also on all other players’ actions.
This interdependence is analogous to (6) but formulated re-
cursively over time.
More precisely, the interdependence of all players optimal
policies is captured in the Nash equilibrium of Problem 1,
defined in Problem 2.
Problem 2. Nash Equilibrium: Find the optimal control
policy pi = [pi1,>, . . . , piN,>]> that yields a local Nash
equilibrium of the POMDP Best Response Game in Problem 1,
such that it satisfies
Qi(b0,u
i, pi¬i) ≥ Qi(b0, pii, pi¬i),∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, (9)
for all ui in the neighborhood of pii.
Based on the necessary condition of Problem 2, we will
derive a local necessary condition for each sub-problem in the
backward pass of our game-theoretic variant of belief iLQG.
A. Problem Formulation
The difficulty in solving POMDPs stems from the infinite-
dimensional space of all beliefs, and that in general the
value function cannot be expressed in parametric form. To
overcome these challenges we describe beliefs by Gaussian
distributions, approximating the belief dynamics using an
extended Kalman filter, and a quadratic approximation of the
value function about a nominal trajectory through the belief
space. We iteratively compute a local Nash equilibrium over all
agents in the proximity of the nominal trajectory by solving
the necessary condition (9) of Problem 2 at each timestep
during a belief-space variant of iLQG to perform the Bellman
backwards recursion in (8). Due to its similarity to iLQG we
benefit from linear scaling O(l) in the planning horizon l,
in contrast to point-based POMDP algorithms which scale
exponentially.
We are given non-linear stochastic dynamics and observa-
tion models in state-transition notation:
xk+1 = f(xk,uk,mk), mk ∼ N (0, I), (10)
zk = h(xk,nk) nk ∼ N (0, I), (11)
where mk and nk are the motion and measurement noise,
respectively. Without loss of generality, we draw both the
motion and measurement noise from independent Gaussian
distributions with zero mean and unit variance since the
noise can be arbitrarily transformed inside these functions.
Depending on the system, motion and sensing noise may be
state and control dependent.
Note that formulating the general dynamics and measure-
ment functions jointly of all agents includes, but is not limited
to, the special case of independent functions for each agent i
as in
f(xk,uk,mk) = [f
1(x1k,u
1
k,m
1
k)
>, . . . ,
fN (xNk ,u
N
k ,m
N
k )
>]>, (12)
h(xk,nk) = [h
1(x1k,n
1
k)
>, . . . , hN (xNk ,n
N
k )
>]>. (13)
We define the Gaussian belief as bk = (xˆ>k ,Σk), by the
mean state xˆk and the variance Σk of the Normal distribution
N (xˆk,Σk).
III. TECHNICAL APPROACH
Before detailing the value iteration method for the Nash
equilibrium solution based on a belief-space variant of iLQG
in Section III-C, we need to derive two important components.
First, we describe the approximation of the general Bayesian
5filter update (4) by an EKF in Section III-A to formulate the
gaussian belief dynamics. This allows us to forward propagate
Gaussian beliefs given an initial belief and a control trajectory
which we utilitze in the game-theoretic variant of belief
space iLQG. Second, we show that the necessary condition
of Problem 2, the Nash equilibrium, is equivalent to a local
necessary condition at each timestep in the Bellman recursion
in Section III-B. The full algorithm is detailed in Section III-E.
A. Bayesian Filter and Belief Dynamics
The general belief dynamics of a current belief bk and
measurement zk+1 are given by the Bayesian filter in (4).
To make the belief propagation tractable we follow [29]
and approximate the Bayesian filter by an extended Kalman
filter (EKF), suitable for non-linear Gaussian beliefs. For
well-defined transition models, the EKF is the standard for
nonlinear state estimation [30, 31]. The EKF makes a first-
order approximation of f(x) with respect to the stochastic
variable x, such that for a given belief bk = (xˆk,Σk) we
have the standard EKF update equations [24, 27]
xˆk+1 = f(xˆk,uk, 0) +Kk(zk+1 − h(f(xˆk,uk, 0), 0)),
Σk+1 = Γk+1 −KkHkΓk+1, (14)
with corresponding matrices defined by
Γk+1 = AkΣkA
T
k +MkM
T
k , (15)
Kk = Γk+1H
>
k (HkΓk+1H
>
k +NkN
>
k )
−1,
Ak =
∂f
∂x
(xˆk,uk, 0), Mk =
∂f
∂m
(xˆk,uk, 0),
Hk =
∂h
∂x
(f(xˆk,uk, 0), 0), Nk =
∂h
∂n
(f(xˆk,uk, 0), 0).
The belief update is dependent on the noisy measurement
zk, causing the belief dynamics to be stochastic. We define
bk = [xˆ
>
k , vec(Σk)
>]>, where vec(Σk) is the matrix Σk
reshaped into vector form, and formulate the stochastic belief
dynamics
bk+1 = g(bk,uk) +W (bk,uk)ξk, ξk ∼ N (0, I), (16)
where ξk is a Gaussian with dimension of the state nx and
gk(bk,uk) =
[
f(xˆk,uk, 0)
vec(Γk+1 −KkHkΓk+1)
]
, (17)
Wk(bk,uk) =
[√
KkHkΓk+1
0
]
. (18)
In this form ξk represents both measurement- nk and motion
noise mk mapped onto the belief transition. The stochastic
Gaussian belief dynamics allow us to propagate beliefs effi-
ciently during the forward pass of the game-theoretic variant
of belief space iLQG.
B. Nash Equilibrium Necessary Condition
While formulating how to propagate uncertainty for the
continous POMDP, we also need to define a tractable pro-
cedure to solve for Nash equilibria. One common method
to solve for Nash equilibria is the method of Iterated Best
Response [9, 11], where control policies are exchanged after
each agent’s separate and independent optimization iteration.
In contrast, we directly integrate the necessary condition of
the Nash equilibrium into the backward pass of a belief space
variant of iLQG. Specifically, we solve a quadratic game at
each stage of the backward pass with a unique solution. First,
we formulate the necessary condition of Problem 2 as
∂Qi(u)
∂ui
= 0,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, (19)
which allows us to compute local Nash equilibria by solving
(19). Theorem 1 states an equivalent condition for Qik(bk,uk),
the expected cost-to-go function from time k to l, defined in
the Bellman recursion (8).
Theorem 1. The necessary condition of the local Nash equi-
librium (19) is equivalent to
∂Qik(bk,uk)
∂uik
= 0, (20)
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, and k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , l − 1}.
Proof: The proof of Theorem 1 follows from the back-
ward recursion in (8). Starting from time (l − 1) we see that
∂Qil−1(bl−1,ul−1)
∂uil−1
= ∂Q
i(b,u)
∂uil−1
= 0, since the expected costs at
previous time steps are unaffected by uil−1. With the same
argument and following the Bellman recursion backwards in
time we find that
[
∂Qi(b,u)
∂uil−1
>
, ∂Q
i(b,u)
∂uil−2
>
, . . . , ∂Q
i(b,u)
∂uik
>]
=
0, is equivalent to[
∂Qil−1(bl−1,ul−1)
∂uil−1
>
, . . . ,
∂Qik(bk,uk)
∂uik
>]
= 0,
for k ≤ l−1. By this reasoning, Qik(bk,uk) only depends on
the subsequent controls, thus completing the proof.
Furthermore, if each agent i finds a policy piik to the
Bellman recursion, all ∂Q
i
k(bk,uk)
∂uik
= 0 necessary conditions
are fulfilled at time k. Note that each agents’ policy pii(u¬i)
depends on the other agents’ inputs u¬i, where ¬i indicates
all other agents. Therefore, solving the Bellman recursion
simultaneously for all agents defines a static game [28], but
more so a game at each stage k of the backward-pass.
In the next section, we describe our solution for integrating
the Nash equilibrium necessary condition at every time k into
the backward pass of a belief-space variant of iLQG.
C. Iterative Dynamic Programming
In this section we describe our belief-space variant of iLQG
for computing local Nash equilibria by solving the Bellman
recursion defined in (8). We denote the nominal belief as
b¯ = b − δb, and the nominal controls u¯ = b − δu, with
s¯ = [b¯>, u¯>]>. At each iteration, the algorithm performs a
backward pass and a forward pass on the current estimate
of the belief b¯ = [b¯0, b¯1, . . . , b¯l] and control trajectory
u¯ = [u¯0, u¯1, . . . , u¯l−1], i.e. the nominal trajectories. In the
backward pass, the algorithm approximates the value functions
for each agent as a quadratic function along the nominal
trajectory, and the value function is propagated backwards in
6time. In the forward pass we produce a new nominal trajectory
based on the value function computed in the backward pass
and applying the associated feedback policy. This iterative
process continues towards a locally optimal solution to the
Nash equilibrium in belief space. The key idea is to main-
tain a quadratic approximation of Qik(bk,uk) and the value
functions V ik (bk).
We first derive the quadratic form of Qik(bk,uk) in Theo-
rem 2 by a Taylor expansion of the dynamics and costs, then
find the minimizing control policy pik = [pi
1,>
k , . . . , pi
N,>
k ]
>
by solving the static game and computing the Nash equilib-
rium over all agents. From this result we compute the value
functions V ik (bk) = Q
i
k(bk, pik) and derive an update law for
V backwards in time.
Theorem 2. By linear expansion of the belief dynamics and
quadratic expansion of the cost and value function, Qik(sk) is
a quadratic of the form
Qik(s¯k + δsk) ≈ Qik +Qi,>s,k δsk +
1
2
δs>k Q
i
ss,kδsk, (21)
where
Qik = c
i
k + V
i
k+1 +
1
2
nx∑
j=1
W
(j),>
k V
i
bb,k+1W
(j)
k , (22)
Qis,k = c
i
s,k + g
>
s,kV
i
b,k+1 +
nx∑
j=1
W
(j),>
s,k V
i
bb,k+1W
(j)
k , (23)
Qiss,k = c
i
ss,k + g
>
s,kV
i
bb,k+1gs,k +
nx∑
j=1
W
(j),>
s,k V
i
bb,k+1W
(j)
s,k .
(24)
Proof: We start by expanding the terms of the action-
value function of the Bellman recursion, cf. (8),
Qik(bk,uk) = c
i
k(bk,uk) (25)
+ E
ξk
[
V ik+1(gk(bk,uk) +Wk(bk,uk)ξk)
]
,
to second order around the nominal control and belief s¯k =
[b¯>k , u¯
>
k ]
>. The term cik(bk,uk) becomes
cik(s¯k + δsk) ≈ cik + ci,>s,k δsk +
1
2
δs>k c
i
ss,kδsk, (26)
with cik = c
i
k(s¯), where c
i
s,k and c
i
ss,k are the Jacobian and
Hessian of cik evaluated at s¯k. To expand the second term on
the right hands side of (25) we first expand the stochastic joint
belief dynamics to
gk(s¯k + δsk) ≈ gk + gs,kδsk, (27)
W
(j)
k (s¯k + δsk) ≈W (j)k +W (j)s,k δsk, (28)
with terms gk = gk(s¯k), W
(j)
k = W
(j)
k (s¯k), and gs,k,
W
(j)
k (s¯k) the respective Jacobians evaluated at s¯k. W
(j)
k
denotes the j-th column of matrix Wk.
We now formulate the second term of (25). We define the
value function as a quadratic around b¯k+1
V ik+1(b¯k+1 + δbk+1) (29)
≈ V ik+1 + V i,>b,k+1δbk+1 +
1
2
δb>k+1V
i
bb,k+1δbk+1
= V ik+1 + V
i,>
b,k+1(bk+1 − b¯k+1) (30)
+
1
2
(bk+1 − b¯k+1)>V ibb,k+1(bk+1 − b¯k+1)
with δbk+1 = bk+1 − b¯k+1 for convenience. Inserting the
expanded dynamics (27), (28) into the second term of (25),
i.e. (30), and evaluating the expectation over ξk yields
E
ξk
[
V ik+1(gk(sk) +Wk(sk)ξk)
]
(31)
≈ E
ξk
[
V ik+1 + V
i,>
b,k+1
(
gk(sk) +Wk(sk)ξk − b¯k+1
)
+
1
2
(
gk(sk) +Wk(sk)ξk − b¯k+1
)>
V ibb,k+1
(
gk(sk)+
Wk(sk)ξk − b¯k+1
)]
(32)
= V ik+1 + V
i,>
b,k+1
(
gk(sk)− b¯k+1
)
(33)
+
1
2
(
gk(sk)− b¯k+1
)>
V ibb,k+1
(
gk(sk)− b¯k+1
)
+
1
2
tr
(
Wk(sk)
>V ibb,k+1Wk(sk)
)
= V ik+1 + V
i,>
b,k+1gs,kδsk +
1
2
δs>k g
>
s,kV
i
bb,k+1gs,kδsk (34)
+
1
2
nx∑
j=1
(W
(j)
k +W
(j)
s,k δsk)
>V ibb,k+1(W
(j)
k +W
(j)
s,k δsk)
>.
Here we use the value function expansion (30) in (32), and
the fact that b¯k+1 = gk(s¯k) in (33) in the form of
gk(sk)− b¯k+1 = gk(sk)− gk(s¯k) = gs,kδsk. (35)
Collecting and grouping all first and second order terms of
(34) and (26) we have that the resulting Qik(s¯k + δsk) is a
quadratic with coefficients given by (22 - 24).
For notational convenience we will drop the time index k for
the Q matrices. We can also recover other partial derivatives
of Qi from (22 - 24):
Qis =

Qib
Qiu1
...
QiuN
 , Qiss =

Qibb Q
i
bu1 · · · QibuN
Qiu1b Q
i
u1u1 · · · Qiu1uN
...
...
. . .
...
QiuNb Q
i
uNu1 · · · QiuNuN
 .
(36)
With Qik(s¯k+δsk) in quadratic form from Theorem 2, at stage
k each agent i solves the quadratic problem
δui,∗k = arg min
δuik
Qi,>s,k δsk +
1
2
δs>k Q
i
ss,kδsk, (37)
yielding a quadratic game in the variables uk with a unique
and simple to compute solution [28]. Theorem 3 presents this
solution.
7Theorem 3. The solution to the quadratic game (37) is given
by
δu∗k = −Qˆ−1uu
(
Qˆu + Qˆubδbk
)
(38)
where Qˆuu, Qˆub, Qˆu, are populated from (36), and defined
Qˆuu =

Q1u1u
Q2u2u
...
QNuNu
 , Qˆub =

Q1u1b
Q2u2b
...
QNuNb
 , Qˆu =

Q1u1
Q2u2
...
QNuN
 . (39)
Proof: By taking the derivative of the objective of (37)
and equating it to zero, the stationarity condition of (37) yields
[
Qiuiui Q
i
uiu¬i
] [ δuik
δu¬ik
]
+Qiuibδbk +Q
i
ui = 0. (40)
Stacking the stationarity conditions of all N agents into a
single system of equations we find
Qˆuuδuk + Qˆubδbk + Qˆu = 0, (41)
where (38) is the solution to this system of equations.
The local necessary condition of Problem 2, derived in
Section III-B holds.
Corollary 1. The solution (38) fulfills the necessary condition
of the local Nash equilibrium (19) at time k.
Proof: From (40), we see ∂Q
i
k(bk,uk)
∂uik
= 0.
We can immediately derive the linear feedback policy for
all agents at planning time k of the form
pik = u¯k + jk +Kkδbk (42)
with jk = −Qˆ−1uuQˆu the feed forward term and Kk =
−Qˆ−1uuQˆub the feedback term. Note that pik contains the
optimal policy of the robot pi0k and also the predicted policies
for all other (N-1) agents pi¬0k . The interdependence has been
resolved by solving (41).
We now formulate the backwards equations to propagate the
value functions V i backwards, hence defining the backward
pass.
Corollary 2. The discrete backwards differential equations of
the value functions V i are
V ik = Q
i +Qi,>u jk +
1
2
j>k Q
i
uujk (43)
V ib,k = Q
i
b +K
>
k Q
i
uujk +K
>
k Q
i
u +Q
i,>
ub jk (44)
V ibb,k = Q
i
bb +K
>
k Q
i
uuKk +K
>
k Q
i
ub +Q
i,>
ubKk, (45)
with terminal constraints
V il = ∂c
i
l(b¯l), V
i
b,l =
∂cil(b)
∂b
∣∣∣∣
b=b¯l
, V ibb,l =
∂2cil(b)
∂b2
∣∣∣∣
s=b¯l
.
(46)
Proof: Substituting the solution (38) and (42) back into
the quadratic (21) yields the value function V ik (b¯k + δbk).
V ik (b¯k + δbk) = Q
i
k(b¯k + δbk, pik)
= Qi +Qi,>u (jk +Kkδbk) +Q
i,>
b δbk
+
1
2
(jk +Kkδbk)
>Qiuu(jk +Kkδbk) +
1
2
δb>k Q
i
bbδbk
+
1
2
(jk +Kkδbk)
>Qiubδbk +
1
2
δb>k Q
i
bu(jk +Kkδbk)
Collecting first and second order terms in δbk gives the
Equations (43-45) in the form of (30). The terminal constraints
(46) result from a tailor expansion of the final cost cil around
the final nominal belief b¯l.
Based on results of Theorem 3 and Corollary 2 we can
propagate the quadratic value functions backwards in time
starting from the terminal constraints at time l.
D. Regularization
With any Newton-like method, care must be taken when the
Hessian Qˆuu is not positive-definite or when the minimum is
not close and the quadratic model inaccurate. To ensure that
the algorithm converges regardless of initial conditions, we
implement a Levenberg-Marquardt style regularization [32].
1) Control Regularization: The control regularization is
achieved by adding a diagonal term of magnitude µu to the
diagonal of Qˆuu, yielding
Q˜iuu = Qˆ
i
uu + µuI. (47)
This simple Levenberg-Marquardt style modification results in
adding a quadratic cost around the current control sequence,
which forces the new optimal control inputs computed by the
backward pass to stay closer to the previous iteration.
2) Belief Regularization: The drawback of the control
based regularization scheme is that even small control per-
turbations can cause large deviations in the state trajectory
potentially inhibiting convergence. To ensure that the updated
belief trajectory does not deviate too far from the previous
iteration, we introduce a scheme that penalizes deviations from
beliefs rather than controls with parameter µb:
Q˜iss,k = c
i
ss,k + g
T
s,k
(
V ibb,k+1 + µbI
)
gs,k (48)
+
n∑
i=1
W
(j),T
s,k
(
V ibb,k+1 + µbI
)
W
(j)
s,k .
The outcome of the state based regularization is placing a
quadratic belief-cost around the previous belief trajectory, sim-
ilar to [33] where a state based regularization was employed.
In contrast to the standard control-based regularization, the
feedback gains Kk do not go to zero as µb →∞, but rather
force the new trajectory closer to the old one. In practice, we
find this improves the robustness of convergence.
E. Algorithm for Dynamic Game Belief Space Planning
We summarize our findings in Algorithm 1, solving for
Nash equilibria of dynamic games in belief space. Theorem 2
lays the foundation for the quadratic game solved in the
8backward pass of Algorithm 1. The solution to the quadratic
game presented in Theorem 3 yields a linear feedback policy
pik for all agents. We propagate the value function in the
backwards pass according to Corollary 2 starting with the
terminal conditions from the terminal cost. We update the
nominal control and belief trajectories in the forward pass
based on rolling out the belief dynamics model and applying
the updated feedback policy pik. If all agents’ action-value
functions improved, we accept the updated nominal belief and
control trajectories and reduce regularization. Otherwise the
trajectories are rejected and the regularization is increased.
The iteration of backward and forward pass continues until
each agents’ action value function Qi converges and changes
less than a specified threshold .
Algorithm 1 Nash Equ. of Dynamic Games in Belief Space
Input: Initial trajectories b¯, u¯, functions cik, cil , f , h
Output: Predicted trajectories b¯, u¯, feedback law pi
1: while |Qi(b¯new, u¯new)−Qi(b¯, u¯)| >  do
2: Backward pass:
3: V ib,l, V
i
bb,l ← From terminal boundary conditions (46)
4: for k from l − 1 to 0 do
5: piik, j
i
k, K
i
k ← Solve quadratic game (42)
6: V ib,k,V
i
bb,k ← Propagate value function (44, 45)
7: end for
8: Forward pass:
9: b¯new, u¯new ← Propagate b0 with g and pi
10: if Qi(b¯new, u¯new) ≤ Qi(b¯, u¯) then
11: b¯, u¯← b¯new, u¯new,
12: lower regularization (47, 48)
13: else increase regularization
14: end if
15: end while
The algorithm yields a linear feedback policy pi0 of robot 0
over the time full time horizon, as well as predicted feedback
policies pi¬0 and predicted belief trajectories b¬0 for all other
agents.
Per iteration of Algorithm 1 l quadratic games are solved
such that its runtime scales linearly O(l) in the planning
horizon l. We benefit from improved scaling during real-time
deployment whereas other POMDP algorithms, even without
taking any game dynamics into account, scale exponentially.
IV. CASE STUDIES
We demonstrate the performance and flexibility of our Algo-
rithm 1 using three case studies that combine the information-
seeking behavior with our game theoretic formulation. These
case studies examine how the agents: play the game, gain
information, and use the information gain to improve their
control policies. We choose these illustrative examples due
to their variations in agent interactions and demonstration
of broader capabilities. Each of the case studies employs a
different dynamics and observation model as well as distinct
objectives for the agents. We find the Nash equilibrium to each
of these games using Algorithm 1.
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Fig. 2. Agent 1 (blue) is pushing Agent 2 (orange) into the light to reduce
the uncertainty over Agent 2 at the end of the planning horizon. Uncertainties
are visualized by covariance ellipses.
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Fig. 3. By nudging Agent 2 onto the circular light source Agent 1 is able to
reduce the uncertainty over Agent 1’s state at the end of the planning horizon.
The lower left inset shows the same scenario without any information gain.
As a result, Agent 1 has no incentive to manipulate Agent 2’s behavior since
there is no way to influence its uncertainty.
A. Active Surveillance
In this case study, Agents 1 and 2 are in an environment with
variable lighting conditions. Agent 1 is tasked with observing
Agent 2, but the quality of the observations depends on the
available lighting at that point of the environment. Agent 2
has no goal, but is assigned the objective of maintaining a
constant velocity while avoiding Agent 1. Neither agent has
perfect information of the other, only a noisy position estimate
forming the initial belief. Using our approach, we show that
Agent 1 can successfully herd Agent 2 into the lighted region
to achieve its surveillance objective, which would not be
possible without incorporating the belief space planning into
the dynamic game. Figures 2 and 3 show the trajectories in
two environments.
The state of both car-like robots x(i) = [x(i), y(i), θ(i), v(i)]
consists of their position (x, y), orientation θ, and speed v. The
control inputs u(i) = [u(i)acc,k, u
(i)
steer,k] are acceleration uacc,k
and steering wheel angle usteer,k. The deterministic continuous
9dynamics of both agents are given by
x˙
(i)
k =
[
v
(i)
k cos θ
(i)
k , v
(i)
k sin θ
(i)
k , u
(i)
acc,k,
v
(i)
k
L tan
(
u
(i)
steer,k
)]>,
where L is the length of the robots. The discrete time dynamics
are defined by
xk = f(xk,uk,mk) = xk + x˙kτ +M(uk) ·mk,
for timestep τ and M(uk) scales the motion noise mk
proportional to the control input uk, such that uncertainty
increases if excessive controls are executed. We encode the
agents objective and goals in this game by defining the current
and terminal costs for Agent 1 and Agent 2 as
c
(1)
k (bk,uk) = u
(1),>
k Ru
(1)
k ,
c
(1)
l (bl) = det(Σ
(2)
x,y,l),
c
(2)
k (bk,uk) = u
(2),>
k Ru
(2)
k + a1(v
(2)
k − v(2)k,des)2 + a2ccoll(xk),
c
(2)
l (bl) = a1(v
(2)
l − v(2)l,des)2 + a2ccoll(xl).
Agent 1’s overall objective is to lower the uncertainty about
the position of Agent 2 at the end of the planning horizon,
encoded by c(1)l (bl). The term det(Σ
(2)
x,y) is equivalent to the
area of the 1σ-threshold ellipse of Agent 2 and representative
of the location uncertainty of Agent 2 at the end of the
planning horizon. Note that both agents penalize control effort
by u(i),>k Ru
(i)
k , and Agent 2 has additional objectives for
maintaining a desired velocity vdes and avoiding collisions via
an exponential barrier ccoll(xk) = exp(−d(xk)), where d(xk)
is the expected euclidean distance until collision between the
two agents, taking their outline into account.
We restrict the robots’ sensing abilities to only include noisy
position measurements. The observation model varies across
the environment based on the available light at a particular
location,
z
(i)
k = h(x
(i)
k ,n
(i)
k ) = [x
(i)
k , y
(i)
k ]
T +N(x
(i)
k ) · n(i)k ,
where the matrix N(x(i)k ) scales the measurement noise based
on the current position (x, y) in the map. We show the nominal
trajectories and the associated beliefs of the solution computed
using Algorithm 1 in Figures 2 and 3. In both cases Agent 1
(blue) is able to force Agent 2 into the light to successfully
reduce uncertainty. The emergent behavior would not have
been possible without belief-space planning, reasoning about
another agent’s uncertainty, and without the dynamic game,
estimating how the own actions influence another agent’s
actions. We show the resulting behavior without belief space
planning and without any reasoning about Agent 2’s uncer-
tainty in the inset of Figure 3.
B. Guide Dog for Blind Agent
In this scenario, Agent 2 guides Agent 1 towards a goal
location while choosing a path that reduces the uncertainty
in Agent 1’s position. The game is won if Agent 1 knows
it reaches the goal location with a low uncertainty about its
state, however, Agent 1 does not have the ability to navigate
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Fig. 4. Guide dog (orange) with leash (black line) guides the blind agent
(blue) towards the goal location (green). While doing so it passes by both light
sources to reduce the uncertainty of the blind person’s position at the goal
location. The top right inset shows the case where the guide dog is indifferent
about the blind person’s uncertainty.
itself. We refer to Agent 1 as the “blind” agent. Following this
analogy, Agent 2 acts as the “guide dog” for the blind agent.
The guide dog can gather information about its own state
and the blind agent’s state by passing through light sources
in the environment which reduces uncertainty. The agents are
tethered together, which we model with spring dynamics and
refer to the tether as the “leash.” If the guide takes the blind
agent on the direct path to the goal, the guide would not have
sufficient information to know it brought the blind agent to
the goal location. Under our approach, the guide dog detours
to key areas to reduce the blind agent’s uncertainty. We use
the analogy of a guide dog leading a blind agent to create an
intuitive visual for the reader, however, this system is relevant
to many other robotic applications.
We model the system dynamics as two masses on a surface
with friction connected by a spring tether. The states of
blind agent and guide dog are x(i) = [r(i),v(i)] the 2D
position r and velocities v. The inputs u(i) = F (i) are their
respective force vectors. The blind agent and guide dog have
masses cmass,h and cmass,d respectively and are bound to friction
coefficients cfric,h and cfric,d. The accelerations are
a(1) = 1/cmass,h(u
(1) − fspring(∆r)− cfric,hv(1)),
a(2) = 1/cmass,d(u
(2) + fspring(∆r)− cfric,dv(2)),
and influenced by the spring force
fspring(∆r) =
∆r
||∆r||cspring max(||∆r|| − cleash, 0),
which is dependent on the distance vector ∆(r) = [r(1)−r(2)].
The dog’s leash is flexible with spring constant cspring and
has length cleash, such that it only generates a spring force if
extended beyond cleash and is otherwise slack. The determin-
istic continuous dynamics are x˙(i) = [v(i),>,a(i),>]>, and the
discrete time dynamics
f(xk,uk,mk) = xk + x˙kτ +M(uk) ·mk,
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for timestep τ and where M(uk) scales the motion noise
proportional to the inputs uk.
We use the cost functions to encode the behaviors and
objects of each agent. Similar to the previous case study,
minimizing det(Σ(1)r,l ) reduces the uncertainty at the end of
the planning horizon. We define
c
(1)
k (bk,uk) = u
(1),>
k Ru
(1)
k + cacc,ha
(1),>
k a
(1)
k ,
c
(1)
l (bl) = 0,
c
(2)
k (bk,uk) = u
(2),>
k Ru
(2)
k ,
c
(2)
l (bl) = det(Σ
(1)
r,l ) + ||r(1)l − rgoal||2.
Here, the term ||r(1)l − rgoal||2 drives the guide dog to relocate
the blind agent to the goal. We reduce the control efforts of
each agent by u(i),>k Ru
(i)
k , and the blind agent has the addi-
tional objective of reducing accelerations with cacc,ha
(1),>
k a
(1)
k .
We use a noisy observation model
z
(i)
k = h(x
(i)
k ,n
(i)
k ) = x
(i)
k +N(x
(i)
k ) · n(i)k , (49)
where the matrix N(x(i)k ) scales the measurement noise based
on the environment shown in Figure 4.
The resulting behavior is shown in Figure 4: The dog
(orange) guides the blind agent (blue) from its initial position
to the blind person’s goal location (green) while reducing the
uncertainty of the blind agent’s final state by planning a slight
detour through the light sources instead of directly towards
the goal location. The guide does so while also taking the
complex interaction originating from the blind person’s forces
on the tether into account. The inset on Figure 4 is the path
taken by the dog with no optimization over the blind agent’s
uncertainty. While it takes a direct path to the goal, the final
uncertainty of the blind agent is large.
C. Autonomous Racing
Finally, we demonstrate our approach in competitive racing,
a common problem in dynamic games. By incorporating belief
space planning into the dynamic game formulation, we show
a significant increase in racing performance. This allows the
agents to reduce uncertainty and decrease chance constraints,
thus maneuvers like overtaking on tight road segments become
possible.
In all racing runs each agent maintains a separate instance of
Algorithm 1. This means that each agent separately computes
their own optimal control actions, the predictions of other re-
spective agents, and each agent computes their own Nash equi-
librium. Additionally, no information is shared among agents.
Since each agent runs a separate instance of Algorithm 1,
Assumption 1 (bij ≈ bii) may or may not be accurate, i.e. the
belief computed by agent j over agent i may only inaccurately
resemble the belief of agent i over itself. Nonetheless, we will
show that despite a first-order belief assumption, the presented
approach yields superior performance to all other baselines.
Each agent’s state x(i) = [x(i), y(i), θ(i), v(i)] and controls
u(i) = [u
(i)
acc,k, u
(i)
steer,k] are the same as in the active surveillance
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Fig. 5. Top: (Distance Transform) Map of the distances to the closest
point on the center line d(p) of the race track shown in Figure 1. Bottom:
(Progress Transform) Map of the progress r(p) along the race track of the
closest point on the center line.
experiment but the different deterministic continuous dynam-
ics are of the from
x˙
(i)
k =
[
v
(i)
k cos
(
θ
(i)
k
)
, v
(i)
k sin
(
θ
(i)
k
)
,
u
(i)
acc,k − cdrag,iv(i)k − cslip,i(θ˙(i))2, θ˙(i)
]>
,
with yaw rate θ˙(i) = v(i)k /L tan
(
u
(i)
steer,k
)
, and drag- cdrag,i and
slip coefficient cslip,i. The stochastic discrete time dynamics,
xk = f(xk,uk,mk) = xk + x˙kτ +M(bk,uk) ·mk,
are subject to noise scaled by M(bk,uk) proportional to the
control input uk as well as the squared yaw rate (θ˙(i))2 of
each agent i separately. The observation model
z
(i)
k = h(x
(i)
k ,n
(i)
k ) = x
(i)
k +N(x
(i)
k ) · n(i)k ,
is subject to noise scaled by N(x(i)k ), depending on the
position on the race track map. As shown in Figure 1, we
indicate zones of low measurement noise as red. It may
be beneficial for agents to plan to drive through these low
measurement noise regions to increase information gain and
to reduce uncertainty.
Each agent’s goal is to maximize progress along the race
track while staying on the track and not colliding with other
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Fig. 6. Top: Blue agent cuts in front of the red agent, forcing the red agent
to break. As a result, the blue agent can remain in front of the red agent at
the end of the turn. Bottom: The red agent blocks the blue agent’s overtaking
maneuver forcing the blue agent to stay behind and take a wider line in the
upcoming right turn. Significant amount of noise is simulated visualized by
the deviation of the true trajectory (solid lines) and the predicted mean of the
belief (dashed lines).
agents. We define the progress along the track for any point
p = (x, y) as arc-length progress r(p) of the closest point
on the centerline. Likewise, we define d(p) as the distance
of the closest point on the track to p. We visualize both the
distance transform as well as the progress transform of the race
track shown from Figure 1 in Figure 5. For competitive racing,
each agent tries to maximize the relative progress over other
agents r(p(i)) − r(p(¬i)). Consequently, agents will engage
in competitive blocking and cutting behavior. We design the
current and terminal costs of each agent as
c
(i)
k (bk,uk) = u
(i),>
k Ru
(i)
k + c
(i)
track(bk) + c
(i)
coll(bk),
c
(i)
l (bl) = −r(p(i)l ) + r(p(¬i)l ),
penalizing control effort by R, while c(i)track(bk) and c
(i)
coll(bk)
keep the agent on the track and out of collision. We achieve
this by finding the upper bound of the 2σ positional uncertainty
Σ
(i)
x,y as α = 2
√
max(eig(Σ(i))x,y )). We can then formulate
a chance collision constraint with other agents (limiting
||p(i) − p(j)||) and the boundary of the race track (limiting
d(p)) by restricting positions in the α vicinity. Finally, to
arrive at c(i)track(bk) and c
(i)
coll(bk) we convert the constraints to
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Fig. 7. Top: Traces of agents comparing MPC and DG. In both cases the
MPC method moves away from the ideal racing line more often due to failed
overtaking attempts. It can not foresee it’s influence on the DG agent’s actions
and thus is less efficient. It is also not able to take advantage of estimating is
implicit control over the other agent like the DG agent. Bottom: Histograms
of the ∆arc-length lead of the faster agent over the slower agent. Green
indicates that the faster agent won the race against the agent starting in the
lead, whereas red indicates the opposite. In comparison, the DG method won
more races than the MPC method and had a higher average lead.
soft constraints, penalizing constraint violation exponentially
strong, as suggested in [29]. Additionally, we also limit control
inputs uk by soft constraints.
1) Competitive Racing: In our racing simulation, each car
executes the current commanded control computed by their
own separate instance of Algorithm 1, and the dynamics
subject to noise are propagated forward. Subsequently, a noisy
observation is generated and the current belief is updated by an
EKF step. Each agent runs an individual EKF, maintains their
own separate belief over themselves and others, and receives
noisy measurements with independently generated noise for
each agent. No information is shared apart from cost and
dynamics models. To test robustness we simulate substantial
amounts of noise, such that the belief b may significantly
deviate from the true state of the system x, shown in Figure 1
and Figure 6.
The algorithm described in this paper is able to synthesize
competitive emergent behavior such as blocking of other
vehicles and cutting in front of others, illustrated in Figure 6.
Additionally, although tight racing lines cut corners very
closely, the chance constraints are successful in prohibiting
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TABLE II
RACING PERFORMANCE: DG VS MPC AND BSP VS NON-BSP
Competition Pair Fraction of Fast winning
Fast DG BSP vs Slow MPC BSP 82%
Fast MPC BSP vs Slow DG BSP 64%
Fast DG BSP vs Slow DG non-BSP 77%
Fast DG non-BSP vs Slow DG BSP 63%
TABLE III
RACING PERFORMANCE: WINNING RATIO
Competition Pair Win ratio
DG BSP vs MPC BSP 1.44:1
DG BSP vs DG non-BSP 1.33:1
collisions under the presence of motion and observation noise.
2) Benefits of Dynamic Game Planning: We compare the
performance of Dynamic Game (DG) planning to conventional
methods such as Model Predictive Control (MPC). The MPC
agent has the exact same cost structure, but assumes constant
input of the other agent. Both DG and MPC plan in belief
space. The MPC is capable of synthesizing competitive racing
trajectories, shown in Figure 7, which are identical to the DG
trajectories when no other agents are present. The performance
of the DG planning distinguishes itself when interactions
occur. We encourage interaction by starting one agent with
lower drag coefficient (and therefore higher speed) behind
another slower agent. The faster agent will eventually catch up
to the previous agent and initiate an overtaking maneuver. The
better interactions are predicted and integrated into planning,
the more successful overtaking maneuvers will occur.
The results of 200 runs are displayed in Figure 7, Table II
and Table III. The DG method wins 44% more races relative
to the MPC baseline and has a larger lead on average. These
results clearly illustrate the competitive advantage of our
game-theoretic algorithm from leveraging how others react to
one’s own actions when planning.
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Fig. 8. Top: The blue agent overtakes the red agent by decreasing the
uncertainty through the low noise region and reducing the chance constraint
(ellipses). Bottom: The blue agent has the same uncertainty over the planning
horizon and fails to overtake since the chance constraints remain large.
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Fig. 9. Top: Traces of agents comparing BSP and non-BSP. In both cases
the non BSP method shows more unsafe behavior, leaving the track several
times and nearly colliding with the other agent. The BSP agent attempts more
aggressive overtaking maneuvers due to the lower uncertainty estimate over
itself and the other agent, as shown in the cutout. Bottom: Histograms of the
∆arc-length lead of the faster agent over the slower agent. Here, the BSP
method won more races than the non-BSP method and had a higher average
lead.
3) Benefits of Belief Space Planning: We also compare the
performance of DG planning with and without Belief Space
Planning (BSP). In the non-BSP case the current belief b0
is held constant over the planning horizon instead of being
influenced by expected measurements. Note that the current
belief is still updated online by an EKF for both agents. Results
are reported in Figure 9 and Table II. The BSP variant wins
33% more races, has a larger average lead, and the fewest
number of collisions. The non-BSP method collides nearly
10 times more often and exhibits behavior inappropriate for
observed uncertainty levels, such as being too conservative
because low noise regions are not considered in the planning
phase, or too aggressive when entering sharp turns since
additional sensor noise due to breaking and steering are not
accounted for.
Figure 8 gives an intuitive explanation for the competitive
advantage of planning in belief space. Without information
gain, the follower will never be able to overtake due to
the large chance constraint, whereas with information gain,
the chance constraint shrinks while moving through a low
noise zone, allowing the blue agent to overtake the leading
agent. As shown in Figure 9 the BSP agent is able to adapt
their trajectories to account for increased noise due to strong
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actuation, i.e. braking and steering, and gaining information
in low noise regions.
D. Real-Time Implementation Details
We implement our solver in the CasADi [34] framework
leveraging auto-differentiation by source code transformation,
automatic problem specific compute graph generation, C-code
generation, and sparse operations. Exploiting sparsity is highly
important to allow for real-time performance since the belief
space, encompassing the mean state and the upper triangle
of the covariance matrix can make respective Jacobian and
Hessian matrices very large. The average compute times on a
Ryzen 7 1700X 3.4 GHz are reported in Table IV. Algorithm
1 was run until convergence starting from a cold start for all
experiments, i.e. the initial control trajectory u consists of all
zeros. Nonetheless, it is also possible to run the algorithm
sequentially by hot starting the optimization with the previous
solution. This is common practice in related optimization
techniques for controls such as sequential quadratic program-
ming [35] and allows to run Algorithm 1 at 100-200Hz. In
these cases it is often enough to run only very few iterations
to update the previous solution.
TABLE IV
AVERAGE COMPUTATION TIME
Experiment Per iteration Until convergence
Active surveillance 9.3 ms 371.3 ms
Guide dog 11.2 ms 474.9 ms
Racing 5.8 ms 110.5 ms
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a formulation for integrating
belief space planning into dynamic games, and present a real-
time algorithm for solving the local Nash equilibria of these
dynamic games in belief space. We demonstrate its perfor-
mance of combining game-theoretic planning and information
gathering with three case studies: active surveillance, guiding
blind agents, and racing with autonomous vehicles.
While game-theoretic planning models the interaction and
dependency among agents, it does not address the quality
of information available to the agent for decision making.
Incorporating belief space planning in dynamic games allows
for new capabilities not possible with other approaches, essen-
tial in house service robots or interacting with human agents
in traffic. Reasoning about another agent’s uncertainty and
simultaneously leveraging the effect of own actions on other
agents’ actions results in complex emergent behavior such as
indirectly pushing and guiding others through regions of light,
without the use of any form direct of communication.
In competitive use cases such as racing emergent behavior
consists of cutting, blocking, forcing others to break hard
with the goal of increasing their uncertainty and slowing them
down in turns, as well as the exploitation of high information-
gain zones for overtaking. In particular, game-theoretic be-
lief space planning significantly increased performance in
dynamic racing when benchmarked against state-of-the-art
planning methods. Game-theoretic belief space planning wins
44% more races when competing with a non-game-theoretic
baseline with belief space planning and 34% more races than
a game-theoretic baseline without belief space planning. In
this work we limit ourselves to first-order beliefs to avoid
the explosion in parameters for recursive beliefs over beliefs.
Nonetheless, even in cases where a first-order belief assump-
tion is a simplification of the true belief dynamics, such as
racing, we see improved performance to baselines that do not
take the belief over other agents into account. In future work
we would like to develop extensions beyond first-order belief
spaces.
We achieve real-time performance running our algorithm at
100Hz, efficiently solving for a Nash equilibrium in belief
space, by solving a quadratic game at each stage of the
recursive backward pass of a belief space variant of iLQG.
This results in linear complexity in the planning horizon in
comparison to exponential complexity of point-based POMDP
algorithms.
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